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THE DOCTRINE OF COLOR OF TITLE
IN NORTH CAROLINA
MONICA KIVEL KALO*
If asked about the term "color of title," the average attorney would
likely be able to respond that it is an instrument that purports to pass
title but fails to do so because of some defect' and is a part of the law of
adverse possession. Thus, at least in legal circles, the doctrine's exist-
ence is well known. However, attempts to probe beneath such surface
familiarity usually reveal that neither the doctrine's meaning nor its
significance is either simple or well-understood. The very richness and
complexity of this somewhat specialized area of adverse possession law
might of themselves justify an examination of this old and uniquely
American jurisprudential invention which has continued to survive
long after the disappearance of the social and economic climate that
gave birth to it.2 However, new social and economic developments over
the past several decades have given renewed and very practical signifi-
cance to the doctrine.
Recent decades have witnessed a tremendous upsurge in real estate
development. Almost overnight, residential subdivisions have sprung
up where large family farms once existed.3 Not only has the number of
small individually owned tracts of land increased, but as our society
has become increasingly mobile,4 families no longer tend to purchase
* Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; B.A., University of
North Carolina at Greensboro; J.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. For purposes of this article, "color of title" is more fully defined as "a writing that pur-
ports to pass title . . . but which does not actually do so either because the person executing the
writing fails to have title or capacity to transfer the title or because of the defective mode of
conveyance that is used." J. WEBSTER, WEBSTER's REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 294
at 320 (P. Hetrick ed. 1981).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 10-24
3. "Every day 12 square miles of America's farmlands vanish forever. Where crops, barns,
and silos once stood, roads, subdivisions, and shopping centers have sprouted. In the past decade
we have lost farmlands equivalent to the combined areas of Vermont, New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey and Delaware." Ognibene, Vanishing Farm-
lands. Selling Out the Soil, SAT. REV., May 1980, at 29. "The U.S. Department of Agriculture
estimates 2 million acres of farmland disappear annually before advancing urban sprawl." Gain-
ing Momentum: .4 Drive to Sop Urban Sprawl, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 21, 1977, at
82.
4. The reasons given for moving include crime, overcrowded schools and pollution, as well
as more positive ones such as promotions and raises. "[Americans] are pulling themselves up by
their roots in order to pursue the good life in places that are smaller, sunnier, safer, and perhaps
saner than those they left." Americans on the Move, TIME, Mar. 15, 1976, at 54.
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land, build a house and remain there for generations. Such factors
have led to the proliferation of title transactions and have made the job
of the title examiner increasingly difficult. Today, a title research span-
ning a fifty-year period may well involve not two or three "links" in the
chain of title but seven or ten or more. Each time that title to land
changes hands, the likelihood increases that some defect may occur
that jeopardizes the title. Then too, some title defects can occur, such
as forged signatures or lack of capacity5 by a prior transferor, which
will not be unearthed even by the most diligent search of the records
but which later surface and create problems for both the purchaser and
the company that issued a policy insuring the title against the existence
of such defects.6
Against this backdrop, adverse possession under color of title repre-
sents a potentially significant method for the curing of defective titles
and the settling of title disputes. First of all, since most claims of title
today are premised on a written instrument such as a deed, a will or a
judgment, the stage is already set for a contention that the instrument
constitutes color of title. Secondly, when possession is maintained
under color of title, the benefits of substantially shorter statute of limi-
tation periods7 and the doctrine of constructive possession' come into
play which together may not only shorten the period of time during
which possession must have continued, but also result in the claimant
being able to acquire title to the entire tract described in his defective
instrument, rather than merely the part that was in his actual posses-
sion and control.
The purpose of this article is to take an in-depth look at the doctrine
of color of title as it exists and operates primarily in North Carolina.
The first major section of the article examines the origins of the doc-
[SImaller families (the product of falling fertility) and the rise of single-person and non-fam-
ily households may allow greater freedom of movement. . . . Furthermore, although work-
ing wives may sometimes reduce the readiness of their husbands to accept job transfers, in
other cases wives may give their husbands greater opportunities to choose jobs according to
criteria other than earning maximization, as was often the case in the past when the hus-
band's job had to support a dependent wife and children.
Long and Hansen, Americans on Wheels, Soc'v, Mar.-Apr. 1980 at 83.
5. Conveyances executed by persons who are non compos mentis are void if the grantor has
been adjudged insane and placed under guardianship prior to the execution of the deed and void-
able if the execution occurs before an adjudication takes place. Davis v. Davis, 223 N.C. 36, 25
S.E.2d 181 (1943). Beeson v. Smith, 149 N.C. 142, 62 S.E. 888 (1908). Although records of judi-
cial determinations are maintained in the county clerk's office, there will be no record of a gran-
tor's incapacity where a formal adjudication or determination of capacity has not been made.
6. Although risks covered by a title insurance policy vary from one company to another,
they insure "almost without exception risks not disclosed by a competent examination of the pub-
lic records, such as the invalidity of recorded instruments which appear to be valid but are void
because of forgery, nondelivery, or incapacity of the maker." BROWDER, CUNNINGHAM, JULIN &
SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 963 (3rd ed. 1979).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53.
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COLOR OF TITLE
trine and its significance with respect to the acquisition of title by ad-
verse possession. After examining the two best-known attributes or
advantages of color of title-a shorter statutory period and the doctrine
of constructive possession-the section focuses on the effect of color of
title in aiding a claimant to establish that his possession was, in fact,
adverse or "hostile." The second major section then addresses the
question of when color of title exists, examining first the basic require-
ments and then the limitations which have been placed on it by the
courts, with special emphasis on the unique North Carolina position
that an instrument executed by a co-tenant which purports to convey
sole title does not constitute color of title. The third and final section
then raises several questions about the existence and operation of color
of title which have as yet to be resolved by the courts, including the
question of whether title acquired under an instrument which consti-
tutes color of title and names as grantees two persons who are husband
and wife results in their acquiring title as tenants in common or as ten-
ants by the entirety.
Although the term "color of title" is used in several sections of the
North Carolina General Statutes, 9 its meaning and significance are in
this state the product of the courts. The doctrine has been slowly evolv-
ing for over two hundred years and all the dust has still not settled.
Thus, the reader would be well advised to settle back for a journey
which has its share of twists and sometimes surprising turns.
PART ONE: ORIGINS AND SIGNIFICANCE
A. Origins
The precise origin of the doctrine of color of title is shrouded in the
mists of the early history of this country, and attempts to pinpoint with
accuracy the moment when the doctrine first emerged have met with
little success."° The term "color of title" appears to have been derived
from the old English method of pleading known as "giving colour,""
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (1969); § 1-38 (Supp. 1981); § 1-340 (1969); § 98-8 (1979).
10. Phipps, Origin of Doctrine of Color of Title, 22 ORE. L. REV. 188 (1943).
11. In an early North Carolina case Judge Henderson offered the following explanation of
the derivation of the term:
Color of title, as applicable to the present subject is evidently the production of our own
country. I would not, therefore, go abroad for an explanation. The name, I presume, was
taken from what is called giving color in pleading, which is never used in this State, and not
often, I believe, in England .... Giving color in pleading is giving your adversary a title
which is defective, but not so obviously so that it would be apparent to one not skilled in the
law. It must be such as would perplex a layman. It, therefore, draws the consideration of the
question from the jury (the lay gents) to the court, which is the object of the pleading.
Tate's Heirs v. Southard, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 119, 120 (1824). For a more detailed discussion of
"giving color" in pleading, see SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 350 (3d ed.
1923); PERRY, COMMON LAW PLEADING 273 (1897); 3 REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 24
(2d ed. 1787).
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but, as one writer has noted, "no English case has been found which
admits and approves of the doctrine as we know it." 2 Thus, within the
context of the law of adverse possession, color of title appears to have
been the product of legislative and judicial responses to distinctly
American economic and geographic realities.
The problems associated with the early settlement and development
of this country which antedate the American Revolution appear to
have provided the impetus for the doctrine. The territorial limits of the
colonies were vast in comparison to England. 3 In addition, the land
was wild and uncultivated and tended to be granted and resold in large
tracts. 4 Thus the situation was ripe for both mistaken and fraudulent
transactions in which the same tract would be sold and resold several
times over to different persons.' 5 As a consequence, there was a great
deal of uncertainty regarding title to land generally.
The situation in North Carolina in the early 1700's provides a vivid
illustration of conditions which provided a climate suitable to the in-
vention of the doctrine. Prior to 1715, no established and well-under-
stood method for making inter vivos conveyances of land existed in the
colony.'6 As a result, many attempted title transactions were subse-
quently discovered to have been ineffectual. Additional title difficulties
resulted from the fact that prior to the time that the boundary between
Virginia and North Carolina was finally established, 7 the Governor of
Virginia had been granting patents to lands which in fact lay in North
12. Phipps, supra note 10, at 195.
13. "Land was a scarce commodity in England .... The colonies, on the other hand,
though they were short of people, cattle, and hard money, had land to burn." L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 52 (1973).
14. The most common method of acquiring land in a number of the early middle and south-
ern colonies was by "head right." Under this system, "[a]nyone who had transported an emigrant
to the colony acquired thereby a claim to fifty acres. . . . In practice the letter of the law was
systematically evaded land] two hundred acres were frequently obtained for one individual
brought to the colony." H. FARNHAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES TO 1860 45 (1938). The prevalence of large grants only increased when the
still-new federal government attempted to provide for the settlement of the Northwest Territory.
Under the Public Land Act of 1796, the minimum size parcel it would sell was set at 640 acres.
Only after it became clear that at the price set (two dollars per acre) such a purchase was beyond
the means of most settlers did the minimum size gradually begin to decline from 640 acres in 1796
until it reached 40 acres in 1832. Id at 133.
15. Phipps, supra note 10, at 192.
16. "The English forms of deeds were not unknown, but the scarcity of conveyancers must
have made them quite rare; and it appears that livery of seisin was not practiced for this was
obsolete even in England. Transfers in various ways were attempted, of course, sometimes by the
mere endorsement of the original patents. But however good sense this might seem to make in
any age, it was not sufficient to convey title in North Carolina at the time." Cox, History of the
Adverse Possession Statutes of Tennessee, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673-674 (1976).
17. For an interesting account of the boundary dispute between Virginia and North Caro-
lina, see W. BOYD, INTRODUCTION TO W. BRYD, HISTORIES OF THE DIVIDING LINE BETWIXT
VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA (1929).
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COLOR OF TITLE
Carolina and often conflicted with patents issued by North Carolina. 8
The result of such conditions, as one early court noted, was that "titles
to lands became so doubtful that no person knew when he was safe in
purchasing."' 9 Such a situation was of great concern to the legislature
because it soon became clear that if settlement and development of the
colony were to be encouraged, some method had to be found to "re-
move these obstacles to population."2
The legislative response was the passage in 1715 of legislation which
prescribed an exclusive method of voluntary conveyance for the fu-
ture.2' Since this did not, of course, remedy any title problems which
already existed with respect to grants and conveyances previously
made, additional legislation was enacted that same year which con-
firmed and declared "good and legal" 22 those titles under which posses-
sion was held for a period of seven years. Although the term
"colourable title" did not appear in legislation until 1791,23 cases de-
cided in the late 1700's and early 1800's held that the 1715 statute dealt
only with possession maintained under an instrument which consti-
tuted color of title.24 Thus, as early as 1797, North Carolina courts were
called upon to address the meaning and operation of the doctrine. As
the remainder of this article will demonstrate, that task was neither
short nor simple and questions still exist today with respect to the oper-
ation and significance of the doctrine. What remains clear, however, is
that in light of the conditions that prevailed here, this country's early
18. [The boundary controversy originated] in the terms of the Carolina charters. That of
1663 declared the northern boundary to be 36', but by the second charter the boundary was
declared to run "from the north end of Currituck river or inlet upon a strait westerly line to
Weyanote Creek which lies within or about the degrees of 36 and thirty minutes northern
latitude .. " Thus a strip of land approximately thirty miles wide was added to Carolina.
Living therein were people holding land grants from Virginia. . . . Until the boundary was
officially established in accordance with the provisions of the second charter, a conflict of
jurisdiction between North Carolina and Virginia was inevitable.
Id at xvi-xvii.
19. Stanley v. Turner, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 14, 20 (1804).
20. Quoted from the observations of Judge Haywood on the case of Armour v. White, 3 N.C.
(2 Hayw.) 69 (1798) and 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 87 (1799), reprinted today in a note to Stanley v.
Turner, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 14, 26 (1804).
21. Ch. 38, 1715 N.C. ACTS.
22. Ch. 27, Sec. 2, 1715 N.C. ACTS.
23. Ch. 15, 1791 N.C. ACTS provided in part
where any person or persons. . . shall have been or shall continue to be in possession of any
lands, tenements, or hereditaments whatsoever, under titles, derived from sales made either
by creditors, executors or administrators of any person deceased, or by husbands and their
wives, or by indorsement of patents or other colourable title for the space of twenty one years,
all such possessions of lands, tenements or hereditaments, under such title, shall be and are
hereby ratified, confirmed and declared to be a good and legal bar against the entry of any
person or persons, under the right or claim of the state to all intents and purposes whatso-
ever. . . . (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Tate's Heirs v. Southard, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 119 (1824); Stanley v. Turner, 5
N.C. (I Mur.) 14 (1804); Armour v. White, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 87 (1799); Grant v. Winborne, 3 N.C.
(2 Hayw.) 56 (1798); Young v. Irvin, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 9 (1797).
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legislatures and courts found the law of adverse possession as it had
existed in England wanting in several respects. It is against this histori-
cal backdrop that the significance of the doctrine of color of title is best
viewed because the benefits which accrue to an adverse possessor who
has color of title are directly related to it.
B. Signficance
The primary significance of color of title,25 and the one addressed by
this article, is its impact on the law of adverse possession. Greatly
oversimplified, adverse possession is a method of acquiring title to land
by the barring of the record owner's right to maintain an action to eject
the wrongful occupant and regain possession of his property.26 Not
every possession of land will, however, have this effect. The litany fa-
miliar to any student taking a course in basic property law is that in
order to acquire title the claimant must establish that his possession of
the property in question was actual, exclusive, hostile, open and notori-
ous, and continuous and uninterrupted for the entire statutory period
applicable.2 7 Although color of title does not obviate any of these re-
quirements, it does to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the
jurisdiction involved, aid the adverse claimant in satisfying a number
of them.
In North Carolina, color of title impacts on the acquisition of title by
adverse possession in three significant respects. First, it affects the
amount of time during which the claimant's possession must continue
without interruption by making applicable a significantly shorter stat-
ute of limitations. Second, it affects the requirement of actual posses-
sion by making available the doctrine of constructive possession.
Third, it appears to aid the claimant in establishing that his possession
was "hostile" by insulating him from having to establish that his pos-
session was maintained with a conscious intent to claim title.
25. In North Carolina, color of title also has significance under the "betterments" statute,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1969).
26. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.3, at 765 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 7 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1013, at 713 (1979).
The form of [American] statutes of limitations varies; in some of them there are provisions
expressly extinguishing the right to title of the former owner; most of them in terms merely
bar the remedy by ejectment; but it is the almost invariable rule that the effect of the statute is
not only to bar the remedy of ejectment, but also to take away all other remedy, right, and
title of the former owner.
Ballantine, Tide byAdverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 139 (1918). The statutes of limita-
tions in force in North Carolina specifically provide that the result of the requisite period of ad-
verse possession is to give the possessor "a title in fee." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 and § 1-40,
infra notes 28 and 29.
27. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.3, at 765.
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1. Effect on the Statutory Time Periods
In North Carolina, the statutes which govern the acquisition of title
by adverse possession distinguish between those situations in which ti-
tle to the land in question is held by the state and those in which the
title is held by private individuals. Adverse possession must be main-
tained for thirty years in order for a claimant to acquire title to land
belonging to the state28 and for twenty years when the land is privately
owned.29 When, however, the claimant's possession was maintained
under an instrument which constitutes color of title, these statute of
limitation periods are reduced to twenty-one years,
30 and seven years, 3'
respectively. Thus, color of title greatly enhances the likelihood that an
adverse claimant will be able to remain in uninterrupted possession for
a sufficient length of time to acquire title by substantially reducing the
period of time during which the owner of the property can bring an
action of ejectment against him.
Many jurisdictions provide for shorter statutory periods when the
adverse claimant enters into possession under color of title.32 North
Carolina's willingness to do so may be traced back to the early 1700's
when, as previously noted, there was a great deal of insecurity about
the validity of land titles. Adverse possession was certainly a legal con-
cept familiar to the colony's early legislative body and, like a number
of the older states, North Carolina appears to have been influenced by
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
The State will not sue any person for, or in respect of, any real property, or the issue or profits
thereof, by reason of the right of title of the State to the same-
(1) When the person in possession thereof, or those under whom he claims, has been in
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this possession having been ascertained and
identified under known and visible lines or boundaries; which shall give a title in fee to
the possessor.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1969) provides:
No action for the recovery or possession of real property, or the issues and profits thereof,
shall be maintained when the person in possession thereof, or defendant in the action, or
those under whom he claims, has possessed the property under known and visible lines and
boundaries adversely to all other persons for twenty years; and such possession so held gives a
title in fee to the possessor, in such property, against all persons not under disability.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
The State will not sue any person for, or in respect of, any real property, or the issue or profits
thereof, by reason of the right or title of the State to the same...
(2) When the person in possession thereof, or those under whom he claims, has been in pos-
session under color of title for twenty-one years. ...
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a) When a person or those under whom he claims is and has been in possession of any real
property, under known and visible lines and boundaries and under color of title, for
seven years, no entry shall be made or action sustained against such possessor by a
person having any right or title to the same. ...
32. See, e.g. ARsz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.523 (1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.16 (West 1982);
GA. CODE ANN. § 85-407 (West 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 83, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
7
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the Statute of James I. 33 That statute, however, set the period of pos-
session necessary to ripen title by adverse possession at twenty years
34
and very likely the legislature felt that if settlement and development of
the colony were to be encouraged, a relatively short time period needed
to be provided for the protection of settlers who had been induced to
settle upon and improve land under instruments which purported to
pass title but turned out to be defective.35 Even with the passage of
time and the development of the colony into a thriving state, the con-
cept of providing additional protection to persons who based their
claims on instruments which purported to grant them title remained.
2. Effect on the Requirement of Actual Possession
An important corollary to the requirement that the claimant must
have been in actual possession of the land in question in order to ac-
quire title to it by adverse possession is the rule that the title acquired is
limited to the amount of land which was in the claimant's actual pos-
session and control.36 When, however, the claimant's possession is
maintained under color of title, this rule is modified to the extent that
his actual possession of a part of a tract will be "constructively" ex-
tended to the boundaries described in his title instrument.37 As may be
illustrated by the following hypothetical, the effect of the doctrine of
constructive possession is likely to be of far more than academic inter-
est both to the adverse claimant and to the record owner of the
property.
Blackacre, a twenty-acre tract of land, is owned but not actually oc-
cupied by 0. X enters into adverse possession of Blackacre but actually
occupies and exerts dominion and control over only five acres of the
tract. If X's possession is not under color of title, the title acquired by
X at the expiration of the applicable statutory period will be limited to
those five acres. However, if X's possession was maintained under an
instrument that constitutes color of title and purports to convey the en-
tire twenty acres to him, his actual possession of five acres will be con-
structively extended over the remainder of the tract and he will acquire
title to all twenty acres.
33. See Stanley v. Turner, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 14, 21 (1804) in which the court compares the Act
of 1715 with 21 Jac. I, Ch. 16.
34. 21 Jac. I, Ch. 16 (1623).
35. Chapter 27 of the Act of 1715 begins by acknowledging the title disputes that had already
arisen due to the boundary controversy between Virginia and North Carolina and concludes by
stating that the purpose of the Act was to prevent leaving "much land unpossessed and titles so
perplexed that no man will know of whom to take or buy land."
36. Carswell v. Town of Morganton, 236 N.C. 375, 72 S.E.2d 748 (1952); Anderson v. Mead-
ows, 162 N.C. 400, 78 S.E. 279 (1913); Bynum v. Thompson, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 578 (1843).
37. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 89 S.E.2d 765 (1955); Ware v.
Knight, 199 N.C. 251, 154 S.E. 35 (1930); Ray v. Anders, 164 N.C. 312, 80 S.E. 403 (1913).
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COLOR OF TITLE
Given the antipathy with which adverse possession is often re-
garded,38 the benefit of constructive possession may appear to be a bit
surprising, since its effect is to deprive the true owner of title to a
greater amount of land than would otherwise occur. Once again, how-
ever, history provides the explanation. A great many early settlers en-
tered into possession of land under instruments which they mistakenly
believed were effective to give them good title to the rather extensive
tracts of land they described and began the long and arduous task of
cultivating and improving the land. Because of the wild and primitive
nature of the land involved, it could take years for a settler to establish
actual dominion and control over any significant amount of acreage.
39
When these settlers later discovered that their instruments were defec-
tive and, therefore, had to rely upon adverse possession as a means of
salvaging their claims, it is not surprising that the early courts were
troubled by the prospect of having to apply a rule that would limit the
title acquired merely to such acreage as a settler had been able to actu-
ally possess and control.4" Such a rule may have been reasonable in
light of the conditions that existed in England, but when viewed in the
context of the conditions that prevailed here in the 1700's, it appeared
exceedingly harsh.
The courts' desire to find a way to circumvent the application of a
rule which would limit the title acquired to such acreage as had been
actually possessed and controlled by a settler has been credited as pro-
viding the major impetus for the invention of the doctrine of color of
38. Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by theft or robbery, a primi-
tive method of acquiring land without paying for it. When the novice is told that by the
weight of authority not even good faith is a requisite, the doctrine apparently affords an
anomalous instance of maturing a wrong into a right contrary to one of the most fundamental
axioms of the law.
Ballantine, supra note 26 at 135 (1918). In a letter to William James written in 1907, Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted that
truth, friendship, and the statute of limitations have a common root in time. The true expla-
nation of title by prescription seems to me to be that a man, like a tree in the cleft of a rock,
gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain
size, can't be displaced without cutting at his life. The law used to look with disfavor on the
statute of limitations, but I have been in the habit of saying that it is one of the most sacred
and indubitable principles that we have, which used to lead my predecessor Field to say that
Holmes didn't value any title that was not based on fraud or force.
M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 417-18 (1943).
39. "The task of subduing the wild land and subjecting it to . . . actual occupancy was a
slow process and had to be accomplished acre by acre." Philbin v. Carr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 575,
129 N.E. 19, 25 (1920).
40. Phipps, supra note 10, at 192-93. See also Note, Limitations on the Doctrine of Construc-
tive Adverse Possession, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 582-83 (1906) in which the author notes that
It]he theory of the general doctrine [of constructive possession] is, that in an undeveloped
country it would be impossible to reduce to possession the whole of the land which the deed
purports to convey; and just as the true owner is deemed to be in possession of all the land
through his deed, so the law will give to the adverse claimant constructive possession of all to
which he has color of title.
9
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title.4 ' The early courts were familiar with the legal theory of construc-
tive possession 42 but needed to find some basis that would render it
applicable to an adverse claimant. As one court noted many years
later, "the courts. . . seized upon the device of 'color of title' . . . . to
secure to [the settler] that which in good faith he sought to acquire and
for which he had planned and toiled.
43
In North Carolina, as elsewhere, the operation of the doctrine of con-
structive possession is subject to certain qualifications or limitations.
44
First of all, constructive possession cannot, of course, apply unless the
adverse claimant is in actual possession of at least some portion of the
tract described in the instrument which constitutes color of title.45 A
correlative limitation based on this principle is that where the instru-
ment constituting color of title describes and purports to convey title to
two distinct tracts of land, the claimant's actual possession of one of the
tracts will not be constructively extended to the other, even if they are
contiguous. 46 Thus, if for example, A enters into possession under a
deed which describes and purports to convey title to Lot 3 and to adja-
cent Lot 4, his actual possession of all or part of Lot 3 will not be con-
structively extended to the other lot. Therefore, at the expiration of the
applicable statutory period, A will fail in an attempt to assert that he
has acquired title to Lot 4 on the basis that he was never in possession
of it.
A second important limitation on the doctrine of constructive posses-
sion is that it must give way in the face of another's actual possession.47
For example, during the applicable statutory period, X is in actual pos-
session of five acres under an instrument that constitutes color of title
and which describes and purports to convey title to a twenty-acre tract.
During the same period, Y, a stranger, is in actual possession of three
acres of the same tract. The title acquired by X will be limited to sev-
enteen acres: the five that were in his actual possession plus the twelve
of which he is deemed to have had constructive possession. It should
also be noted that if in the preceding example Y were not a mere stran-
41. Phipps, supra note 10, at 191-93.
42. Id at 192-93.
43. Philbin v. Car, 75 Ind. App. 560, 575-76, 129 N.E. 18, 25 (1920).
44. See generally Note, supra note 40, at 582.
45. Bumgardner v. Corpening, 246 N.C. 40, 97 S.E.2d 427 (1957); Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C.1, 89 S.E.2d 765 (1955); Carswell v. Town of Morganton, 236 N.C. 375, 72
S.E.2d 748 (1952).
46. Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964); Loftin v. Cobb, 46 N.C. (1
Jones) 406 (1854). Cf Alsworth v. Richmond Cedar Works, 172 N.C. 17, 89 S.E. 1008 (1916) (the
fact that the land has been subdivided into lots on a map will not prevent constructive possession
from extending to the entire tract when it previously had been conveyed as one large undivided
tract).
47. Tredwell v. Reddick, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 56 (1840); Ring v. King, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. &
Bat.) 301 (1838); Graham v. Houston, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 232 (1833).
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ger without any claim to the property but were the true owner of the
tract described in X's deed, his true title would be deemed to construc-
tively extend his actual possession to all the property not actually pos-
sessed by another.48 Therefore, under these facts, X would not be
deemed to have had constructive possession of any of the tract and the
title he acquires by adverse possession will be limited to the five acres
he actually possessed.
A third and somewhat related limitation on the doctrine of construc-
tive possession is to be found in the rules developed by the courts to
deal with "lappage" cases-situations in which the deeds of two rival
claimants contain descriptions which in part cover the same area. For
example, suppose that 0, the owner of a hundred-acre tract of land
executes and delivers a deed to A which describes and conveys the wes-
tern fifty acres of the original tract. 0 subsequently executes and deliv-
ers a deed to B which was intended to convey the remainder of the tract
but which in fact describes and purports to convey the eastern sixty
acres of the original tract. As a result, the deeds of A and B "lap" on
each other for a ten-acre section. When a dispute later arises as to the
ownership of the lappage, it often becomes necessary for the court to
determine which of the claimants should be considered to have had
constructive possession of it. The determination is based on a set of
established rules that operate to give A, as the senior or superior title
holder, a certain measure of preference. If neither claimant was in ac-
tual possession of the lappage, A will be deemed to have had construc-
tive possession of it on the basis of his senior or superior title. If only
one of the claimants is in actual possession of some part of the lappage,
he will be deemed to have had constructive possession of all of it, re-
gardless of whether he is the junior or senior claimant. If both claim-
ants were in actual possession of part of the lappage, A will be deemed
to have had constructive possession of any portion of the lappage that
remained unoccupied on the basis of his superior title.
49
Unlike some states, North Carolina does not qualify the doctrine of
constructive possession by requiring that the amount of land actually
possessed bear some significant relation to the amount of acreage de-
scribed in the instrument constituting color of title.50 However, the
courts of this state have long recognized the doctrine of "slight en-
48. Vance v. Guy, 224 N.C. 607, 31 S.E.2d 766 (1944).
49. Price v. Tomrich Corp. 275 N.C. 385, 167 S.E.2d 766 (1969); Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232
N.C. 236, 60 S.E.2d 101 (1950).
50. Lenoir v. South, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 237 (1849). The limitation, which appears to have first
surfaced in a New York case, Jackson v. Woodruff, 1. Cow.276 (1823), has been severely criti-
cized. Note, supra note 40, at 584. For a discussion of the limitation and a listing of cases from
jurisdictions which do recognize it, see 7 R. POWELL, supra note 26, § 1017, at 738; 4 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1155, at 819 (3d ed. 1939).
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croachment" which can have the effect of defeating an adverse claim-
ant's assertion of constructive possession when it is predicated upon an
actual possession which was "insignificant" in area.5' The doctrine is
invoked in cases in which the adverse claimant has good title to the
land adjoining the property in dispute and actually encroached upon
and occupied only a small area across his true boundary. In such cases,
the presumption that due to constructive possession the adverse claim-
ant acquired a title coextensive with the boundaries described in his
color of title instrument can be rebutted if the jury determines that such
a minor encroachment was equivocal in nature and thus would have
been overlooked even by a vigilant owner."2
A final significant limitation on the operation of constructive posses-
sion can result from words or conduct by a claimant during the statu-
tory period which indicate that he disclaims any intent to claim title
beyond a line which is later discovered to fall short of the boundary
described in the instrument that constitutes color of title.5 3 For exam-
ple, if A enters into possession of a tract of land whose northern bound-
ary is described in a deed which constitutes color of title as lying at a
particular place but during the statutory period A and the owner of the
property which adjoins A's tract on the north agree upon a boundary
line which in fact falls short of the one described in A's deed, A will not
thereafter be deemed to have been in constructive possession beyond
the line agreed upon.
Despite the various limitations or qualifications to which the doc-
trine of constructive possession is subject, it remains a potentially sig-
nificant benefit to an adverse possessor and continues to be an attribute
of color of title which is recognized in every state.
3. Effect on the Requirement of Hostile Possession
a. In General
Since the essence of the acquisition of title by adverse possession is
the barring of the owner's cause of action to eject, it is clear that in
order to start the statute of limitations running, the owner must have a
cause of action stemming from another's possession of his property that
is inconsistent with and "hostile" to his rights.5" Like most jurisdic-
51. Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N.C. 11, 94 S.E. 703 (1917); Waldo v. Wilson, 173 N.C. 689,
92 S.E. 692 (1917); Blue Ridge Land Co. v. Floyd, 171 N.C. 543, 88 S.E. 862 (1916); King v. Wells,
94 N.C. 344 (1886); Green v. Harman, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 158 (1833).
52. McLean v. Smith, 106 N.C. 172, II S.E. 184 (1890).
53. Pennell v. Brookshire, 193 N.C. 73, 135 S.E. 257 (1927); Haddock v. Leary, 148 N.C. 378,
62 S.E. 426 (1908). Cf. Anderson v. Meadows, 162 N.C. 400, 78 S.E. 279 (1913). ("Adverse pos-
session does not extend beyond the claim, although this may fall short of the lines of a deed, under
which one is in possession." 162 N.C. at 403, 78 S.E. at 280).
54. A large number of cases refer to the requirement that the possession be hostile and under
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tions, North Carolina adheres to the view that possession of property is
presumed to be in subordination to the rights of the true owner55 and
thus requires that the adverse possessor establish that his possession
was hostile in nature.56 This subsection of the article examines the ef-
fect of color of title on the ability of a claimant to meet this burden.
"Hostility" in the context of the law of adverse possession does not
mean ill will or animosity;57 rather, it signifies that the adverse claimant
must have been in possession of the property in dispute claiming it ex-
clusively and in his own right and not in subordination to the rights of
the true owner. 58  Most jurisdictions utilize what has been termed an
"objective '5 9 approach to the issue of hostility since the focus is upon
the claimant's actions, rather than upon his actual intent or state of
mind. Under this approach, proof by the claimant that he occupied the
property in dispute without the permission of the owner and that he
made such actual, open and exclusive use of it as would an average
owner establishes that his possession was hostile. ° Even under the ob-
jective approach, color of title has frequently been considered of benefit
to an adverse claimant on the basis that it lessens the quantum of proof
he would otherwise have to supply with respect to the notoriety and
frequency of his acts as "owner," since it is a circumstance that in itself
tends to show that possession was not taken in subordination to the
rights of the true owner.6
North Carolina, while placing the burden on the adverse possessor of
"claim of fight" or "claim of title." However, most of the cases do not mean that the occupant
must actually assert during the statutory period that he is in fact the owner.
In most of the cases asserting this requirement, it means no more than that possession must be
hostile, which in turn means only that the owner has not expressly consented to it by lease or
license or has not been led into acquiescing in it by the denial of adverse claim on the part of
the possessor.
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.4 at 776.
55. Barbee v. Edwards, 238 N.C. 215, 77 S.E.2d 646 (1953); Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C. 255,
63 S.E.2d 630 (1951). This view is codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-42 (1969) which provides in
pertinent part:
In every action for the recovery or possession of real property, or damages for a trespass on
such possession, the person establishing a legal title to the premises is presumed to have been
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such premises by
any other person is deemed to have been under, and in subordination to, the legal title....
56. Thomas v. Hipp, 223 N.C. 515, 27 S.E.2d 528 (1943); Barrett v. Williams, 217 N.C. 175, 7
S.E.2d 383 (1940); Berry v. McPherson, 153 N.C. 4, 68 S.E. 892 (1910).
57. State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 166 S.E.2d 70 (1969); Dulin v. Faires, 266 N.C. 257, 145
S.E.2d 873 (1965); Brewer v. Brewer, 238 N.C. 607, 78 S.E.2d 719 (1954).
58. Garris v. Butler, 15 N.C. App. 268, 189 S.E.2d 809 (1972); State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175,
166 S.E.2d 70 (1969); Brewer v. Brewer, 238 N.C. 607, 78 S.E.2d 719 (1954).
59. G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 2548, at
630 (repl. ed. 1979); 7 R. POWELL, supra note 26, § 1015, at 726-732.
60. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.4, at 776-77.
61. Vick v. Berg, 251 Ark. 573, 473 S.W.2d 858 (1971); Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Authority of City of St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69 (1964). See also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.4(a) at 785; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 50, § 1148 at 800-801.
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establishing that he was in possession of the property in question with
an intent to hold it in opposition to the rights or claims of all others,
appears to subscribe to the objective approach in cases that do not in-
volve disputes between adjoining land owners62 by allowing such an
intent to be inferred from the actions of the adverse possessor during
the statutory period. Thus, proof of actual, exclusive and open acts of
possession and control that afford "unequivocal indication to all per-
sons that [the claimant] is exercising thereon the dominion of owner"63
may help him to establish that he had the requisite hostility.6
Despite the fact that a claimant's burden of establishing that his pos-
session was not held in subordination to the rights of the true owner is
somewhat lightened when the possession is predicated upon an instru-
ment that constitutes color of title, the existence of color of title is not
essential to his success. As a result, the doctrine's true significance does
not emerge until one examines North Carolina's approach to hostility
in cases which involve disputes between adjoining land owners as to
the ownership of a strip of land that lies along the adverse claimant's
true boundary and onto which he entered into possession under the
mistaken belief that he owned it.
b. In Mistaken Boundary Cases
In cases which involve an assertion of title by adverse possession to a
strip of land along the claimant's true boundary, North Carolina con-
tinues to subscribe to a subjective approach to hostility under which the
claimant must establish that he was in possession with the intent to lay
claim to land known by him to belong to someone else. Under this
62. As demonstrating that North Carolina does not subscribe to a subjective approach to
hostility in adverse possession cases which do not involve boundary disputes, see Battle v. Battle,
235 N.C. 499, 70 S.E.2d 492 (1952). In Battle, the claimants went into possession of a tract of land
under the mistaken belief that it had in fact been conveyed to them. However, due to an error not
discovered at the time, the description in the deed did not include the tract in dispute. In evaluat-
ing the character of the claimants' possession, the court noted that "[t]his was not a case of mir-
taken boundary, but on the contrary, plaintiffs' evidence tended to show claim oftitle as owners of
a particular lot under known and visible boundaries." (emphasis added) Id at 501, 70 S.E.2d at
494.
63. Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 238, 75 S.E. 347, 348 (1912).
64. Like other jurisdictions, North Carolina recognizes that the relationship between the oc-
cupant and the owner of the property in dispute may affect the conduct required to establish
hostile possession. Thus, when the legal or familial relationship between the occupant and the
owner is such that the occupant's open and exclusive possession would not be deemed to be incon-
sistent with or antagonistic to the owner's right or title, his possession will not trigger the running
of the statute of limitations unless and until he clearly and unequivocally repudiates the owner's
right and title in such a way as to give him notice that he is asserting a claim hostile to his title. J.
WEBSTER, supra note I, § 289, at 313-314. See, e.g., Watson v. Chilton, 14 N.C. App. 7, 187
S.E.2d 482 (1972) (parent and child); Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964)
(cotenants); Hancock v. Davis, 179 N.C. 282, 102 S.E. 269 (1920) (husband and wife when they are
living together); Miller v. Bingham, 36 N.C. (I Ired.) 423 (1841) (trustee and cestui que trust).
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"conscious intent ' 65 approach, a possession that is premised merely
upon a mistaken belief of ownership is not "hostile" and will not ripen
into title no matter how long continued.66 It is indeed unfortunate that
North Carolina continues in such cases to adhere to an approach to the
issue of hostility that has been severely criticized 67 as illogical,68 an evi-
dentiary nightmare,69 and as having the effect of rewarding the con-
scious "landgrabber" while penalizing the honestly mistaken
possessor.70 However, an extended analysis of the many weaknesses
inherent in the subjective approach is beyond the scope of the present
65. The term "conscious intent" is derived from Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d
630 (1951). See infra note 66. The late Professor James Webster, a recognized authority on North
Carolina property law, used the term to denote this variety of subjective approach. J. WEBSTER,
supra note I, § 293, at 320.
66. Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C. 255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951) vividly illustrates the operation of
this approach to the issue of hostility. In Gibson, the plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining lots
separated by a driveway. A dispute arose as to the ownership of the driveway and an examination
of their respective deeds revealed that the driveway in fact lay part on the plaintiffs lot and part
on that of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff had neither title nor color of title to the strip of
driveway in dispute. Undaunted, the plaintiff filed suit, contending that he was entitled to sole
ownership of the entire driveway by virtue of more than twenty years of open, exclusive and
adverse possession. The turning point in the case appears to have occurred when the plaintiff
testified that at the time he purchased his lot in 1924, he thought that his deed covered the whole
of the driveway, including the portion in dispute. Referring to this testimony, the court noted that
even if the plaintiffs possession were "exclusive, open and notorious, as he now contends, no one
regarded it as hostile or adverse, not even the plaintiff himself, for he was not conscious of using
his neighbor's land." Id at 258, 63 S.E.2d at 63 1. The court then proceeded to apply the rule that
"every possession of land is presumed to be under the true title ... and if the possession is by
mistake . . . and not with the intent to claim against the true owner, it is not adverse." Id, 63
S.E.2d at 632.
67. See e.g., 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.5 at 789; Bordwell, Mistake
in Adverse Possession, 7 IowA L. BULL. 129 (1922); Day, The Validation of Erroneously Located
Boundaries by Adverse Possession andRelated Doctrines, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 245, 255-257 (1957);
Note, Adverse Possession-Intent as a Requisite in Mistaken Boundary Cases, 33 N.C. L. REV. 632
(1955); Note, Adverse Possession in Boundary Cases, 4 Wis. L. REV. 41 (1926).
68. The objection on the basis of logic stems from the fact that irrespective of the occupant's
state of mind, he is still subject to an action of ejectment brought by the owner. "[S]urely a
mistaken occupation of another's land is as much an usurpation of his dominion as one without
mistake. Either is adequate to sustain trespass quare clausumfregit or ejectment." Note, Adverse
Possession in Boundary Cases, 4 Wis. L. REV. 41 (1926).
69. With respect to evidentiary considerations, there are two interrelated objections. First,
there is the difficulty of adducing satisfactory evidence of mental attitude. As one leading case
noted, when the focus moves from the question of visible and exclusive possession to the claim-
ant's state of mind, there is a departure from a "plain and easy standard of proof... and invisi-
ble motives of the mind are to be explored." French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831). Secondly
there is the problem of the reliability of the evidence. As one writer on the subject has noted:
In most instances the possessor has during the running of the statutory period given no
thought to the nature of his claim. Even when he is innocent of conscious perjury, however,
he usually makes the response both on direct and cross-examination that advances his
cause-at least if he has been thoroughly instructed on the intricacies. . . . With reference to
such indefinite matters it is easy to believe as one desires. Such testimony is not of the highest
order of credibility.
Day, supra note 67, at 259.
70. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.5 at 789; Bordwell, supra note 67, at
132.
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article and the relevant question at this juncture is whether a claimant's
mistaken belief of ownership is fatal when the belief was induced by
the fact that he has an instrument that describes and purports to convey
a tract that includes the strip in dispute, i.e., he was in possession of it
under color of title. The answer appears to be an almost unqualified
"6no.,,97 1
An examination of "lappage cases ' ' , the color of title equivalent of
the mistaken boundary dispute, reveals only two types of situations in
which an adverse possessor's assertion of title to the strip in dispute has
been defeated on the ground that he lacked an intent to claim title to
it. The first such situation involves an attempt to assert title when the
strip in dispute, although described in the claimant's title instrument,
lay beyond a line previously agreed upon as the boundary of his tract.73
Although the court predicated its denial of his claim on the basis that
his conduct evidenced a lack of intent to claim title to the land in dis-
pute, the result is also, and more justifiably, explainable on the equita-
ble ground of estoppel.74  Even under the objective approach to
hostility, words or conduct on the part of an adverse claimant which
amount to a virtual disclaimer of any intent to claim title are held to
estop him from subsequently asserting title by adverse possession on
the ground that such conduct tends to induce the true owner to refrain
from taking legal action to protect his rights to the property in
dispute."
The second situation in which an adverse possessor's lack of an in-
tent to claim title has been the basis for denying his assertion of title
involves cases in which the doctrine of "slight encroachment" is in-
voked. As previously discussed,7 6 such cases involve situations in
which the adverse possessor's actual possession of the strip in dispute
amounts to an "insignificant" amount of acreage beyond his true
boundary. Several cases refer to the doctrine of slight encroachment as
being premised on the notion that such a small amount of wrongful
occupancy allows a jury to presume that the possession was not taken
with an intent to claim title but was inadvertent and, therefore, not
71. See e.g., Whiteheart v. Grubbs, 232 N.C. 236, 60 S.E.2d 101 (1950) in which an adverse
claimant who had color of title to the strip in dispute was allowed to prevail despite the fact that
her testimony established that she had occupied it under the mistaken belief that she in fact had
good title to it.
72. See supra text accompanying note 49.
73. Haddock v. Leary, 148 N.C. 378, 62 S.E. 426 (1908).
74. In fact, the court in Haddock quoted with approval a Georgia case in which that state's
highest court had declared that "possession of land under color of title, however long continued,
will not ripen into a prescriptive title if, instead of being attended with a claim of right, such right
be expressly disclaimed pending possession." Id at 382-383, 62 S.E. at 428 (emphasis added).
75. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 15.4 at 775 and § 15.5 at 789.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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hostile." However, the result in such cases can be justified on the basis
that occupancy of a very small amount of acreage across the true
boundary fails to meet the requirement of being "open and notori-
"78 inous,, and, in fact, a number of the cases acknowledge that aspect.79
Almost all persons who enter into possession of land under color of
title do so in the mistaken belief that the instrument upon which their
claim is premised was effective to convey title to the tract that it de-
scribes and only later discover that it was not. This was, in fact, the
situation confronting many early settlers whose plight provided the ma-
jor impetus for the development of the doctrine of color of title in
North Carolina.8 ° The effect of applying a "conscious intent" or "mis-
take is fatal" subjective approach in such cases would be to destroy the
doctrine of adverse possession under color of title for all practical pur-
poses since a claimant could prevail only when he could establish that
he knew all along that his title instrument was defective."' As one early
court noted,
If every man who is induced by an honest misunderstanding as to the
sufficiency of a title that purports upon its face to convey land to enter
into possession were denied the benefit of his open, notorious adverse
occupancy until he should take the laboring oar and satisfy a jury that
he did not make a mistake, the difficulty of proving the actual intent
entertained by one under whom claim is made, in first entering on the
land, would often destroy titles acquired by possession and universally
recognized as good. Indeed, the doctrine of color of title is founded
77. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 175 N.C. 11, 94 S.E. 703 (1918); Waldo v. Wilson, 173
N.C. 689, 92 S.E. 693 (1917); Currie v. Gilchrist, 147 N.C. 648, 61 S.E. 581 (1908); King v. Wells,
94 N.C. 344 (1886).
78. The requirement of "open and notorious" possession is designed to provide the owner of
the land with an opportunity to learn of the existence of the occupant's claim and take action to
protect his rights. 4 TIFFANY, supra note 50, § 1140, at 727; 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 26, § 15.3(a) at 768. The nature and location of the land is often said to affect the
question of whether the possession is open and notorious and there are many North Carolina
cases that declare that the possession "must be decided and notorious as the nature of the land will
permit." Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 237-238, 74 S.E. 347, 348 (1912). See also Vance v.
Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117 (1943); McKay v. Bullard, 207 N.C. 628, 178 S.E. 95 (1935);
Holmes v. Carr, 172 N.C. 213, 90 S.E. 152 (1916); Loftin v. Cobb, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 406 (1854).
79. "[W]hen the portion into which the actual entry is made, and possession taken is very
minute, . . an owner of reasonable diligence and ordinary vigilance, might remain ignorant that
it included his land .. " Green v. Harman, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 158, 164 (1833). "We do not think
the actual possession of so minute a part of a 640 acre tract. . . . was of itself necessarily notice to
defendants that plaintiffs claimed adversely the entire tract." Waldo v. Wilson, 173 N.C. 689, 692,
92 S.E. 692, 693-94 (1917). "The quantity of land taken into the enclosure is not so insignificant
that a vigilant man would have overlooked the trespass. McLean v. Smith, 106 N.C. 172,
179, 11 S.E. 184, 186 (1890).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
81. See 2 DEMBITZ, LAND TITLES, 1397 (1895) in which the author notes that "[if possession
through mistake were held not to be adverse, very little room would be left for the statute of
limitations, for almost every man who buys land under a bad title labors under the mistaken idea
that his deed is good and effectual."
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upon the idea of entering upon land 82 in the reasonable belief that one
is the true owner.
Thus, both history and logic lead to the conclusion that the greatest
significance of color of title with respect to an adverse possessor's abil-
ity to establish that his possession was "hostile" lies in its ability to
insulate him from the necessity of establishing that his possession of the
property in dispute was the result of a conscious intention to lay claim
to his neighbor's land. It thus has the laudable effect of allowing the
parties in the case and the trier of fact to focus upon whether the claim-
ant's possession was actual, exclusive, open and notorious for the appli-
cable statutory period, rather than upon attempting to ascertain the
claimant's "invisible motives."
8 3
PART Two: WHAT CONSTITUTES COLOR OF TITLE
When a participant in a title transaction discovers that it was ineffec-
tive to actually transfer title to him, he is often left with no alternative
than to assert that he has acquired the title by adverse possession. In
light of the benefits that may accrue when possession is maintained
under color of title, it is not surprising that the claimant will try to
assert that the ineffective transaction constitutes color of title. The defi-
nition of color of title84 alludes to two distinct, although not mutually
exclusive, categories of defective title transactions as sources of color of
title. One such category might be labelled "substantively" defective be-
cause the invalidity of the transfer stems from either the transferor's
lack of title or his lack of capacity to transfer the title in question due to
minority" or insanity.86 The other category, which might be labelled
"procedurally" defective, is composed of transactions which are inef-
fective to transfer title because the parties failed to observe all the for-
malities required by the particular mode of conveyance utilized.
However, not every transaction which is ineffective to transfer title will
qualify as color of title.
By way of illustration, it might be helpful to visualize all putative
title transactions as comprising a spectrum. At one extreme are those
which meet all substantive and procedural requirements and actually
do effectuate a transfer of the title in question. At the other extreme are
82. 106 N.C. at 177, 11 S.E. at 185-86.
83. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831).
84. See supra note 1.
85. Deeds executed by minors are voidable and may be disaffirmed within three years after
reaching majority. Baggett v. Jackson, 160 N.C. 26, (1912). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1 (1976),
abrogates the common-law definition of minority and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (1976) defines it
as being under the age of eighteen. These sections became effective July 5, 1971. See also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 39-13.2 (1976 & Supp. 1981) which governs the validity of deeds executed by mar-
ried persons who are under the age of eighteen.
86. See supra note 5.
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those which are deemed so defective that not only do they fail to actu-
ally transfer the title in question, but they also fail to constitute color of
title. In between these two extremes lie transactions which are in fact
defective and fail to transfer the title in question but which nonetheless
constitute color of title. The line of demarcation between those defec-
tive transactions which constitute color of title and those which do not
is the focus of this section. The first part consists of a discussion of
three requisites of an effective title transfer which are also generally
considered to be indispensable to color of title. The second part then
assesses the impact of three other matters on the question of when an
ineffective title transaction can serve as color of title in North Carolina.
A. Basic Requirements
Despite the variety of recognized methods by which title to land may
be transferred, there are three requisites of an effective transfer which
are not only common to all8 7 of them but which are also generally con-
sidered to be indispensable to color of title: (1) a writing; (2) which
purports to pass title; (3) to a definitely described tract. Thus in most
jurisdictions, any transaction which fails to meet these requirements
will not only be ineffective to actually transfer title but will also fail to
constitute color of title.
The proposition that a writing is indispensable to the existence of
color of title should be prefaced with an acknowledgement that state-
ments to the effect that a writing is not essential can frequently be
found in adverse possession cases s.8  Although there are, in fact, a few
jurisdictions which genuinely adhere to the view that under certain cir-
cumstances color of title can consist of oral declarations,8 9 most such
statements are merely the result of an unfortunate tendency by courts
to use the term "color of title" and "claim of title" as if they were inter-
changeable.9" They are not. When used in its technical sense, "claim
of title," and its true synonym "claim of right," refer to the necessity
that an occupant establish that his possession was adverse or hostile
and not in subordination to the rights of the true owner. Since in most
jurisdictions this can be shown by words or conduct and does not need
a written basis,9 ' it is easy to see how the careless use of the term "color
87. Excluded are transfers of title resulting by intestate succession which occur by operation
of law rather than by action of the parties or the courts.
88. Brown v. Norvell, 96 Ark. 609, 132 S.W. 922 (1910); Lebanon Mining Co. v. Rogers, 8
Colo. 34, 5 P. 661 (1884); Cooper v. Ord, 60 Mo. 420 (1875); Green v. Kellum, 23 Pa. 254 (1854).
89. Nelson v. Johnson, 189 Ky. 815, 226 S.W. 94 (1920); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Childs, 113
Miss. 246, 64 So. 146 (1917).
90. Roe v. Doe, 162 Ala. 151, 50 So. 230 (1909); Philbin v. Carr, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N.E.
19 (1920),reh'g denied, 75 Ind. App. 560, 129 N.E. 706 (1921); Morrison v. Linn, 50 Mont. 396, 146
P. 166 (1915); Fitschen Bros. Commercial Co. v. Noyes' Estate, 76 Mont. 175, 246 P. 773 (1926).
91. Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547, 69 S.E. 614 (1910) ("The term, 'color of title', is not
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of title" in this context results in confusion.
North Carolina very early held a writing to be indispensable to color
of title92 and the rule has never seriously been questioned. Any contro-
versies which have arisen with respect to this requirement have con-
fined themselves to whether a particular writing constituted color of
title. It is at this point that the second requirement of purporting to
pass title comes in and confines the operation of color of title to trans-
actions which by their nature are capable of not merely affecting title to
land but of transferring it. Under this test, writing such as leases,
9 3
letters,94 and transfers of liens95 have all been held not to constitute
color of title. On the other hand, writings such as deeds, both private
96
and official,9" wills, 98 judgments,99 and mortgages'0° have been held to
constitute color of title since, by their very nature, they are capable of
effectuating a transfer of title from one party to another. Even bonds
for title or executory contracts to convey land have been approved by
the North Carolina courts on the basis that they should be considered
instruments that purport to convey at least an equitable interest.10'
There is an additional ramification of the requirement of purporting
to convey title which deserves mention. Not only does an instrument
synonymous with 'claim of title,' as used in the statutes of some states. To constitute color of title
there must be a paper title to give color to the adverse possession, whereas a claim of title may be
constituted wholly by parol." Id at 548, 69 S.E. at 615.)
92. Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547, 69 S.E. 614 (1910); Tate's Heirs v. Southard, 10 N.C. (3
Hawks) 119 (1824).
93. Sparrow v. Dixie Leaf Tobacco Co., 232 N.C. 589, 61 S.E.2d 600 (1950).
94. Young v. Pittman, 224 N.C. 175, 29 S.E.2d 551 (1944).
95. Turner v. Neisler, 141 Ga. 27, 80 S.E. 461 (1913).
96. Lofton v. Barber, 226 N.C. 481, 39 S.E.2d 263 (1946); Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27
S.E.2d 117 (1943).
97. Campbell v. Campbell, 221 N.C. 257, 20 S.E.2d 53 (1942) (sheriff's deed); Ruark v.
Harper, 173 N.C. 249, 100 S.E. 584 (1919) (tax deed); Kron v. Hinson, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 347
(1860) (grant from the state). A 1963 proviso to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1969) specifically de-
clares that "commissioner's deeds in judicial sales and trustee's deeds under foreclosure shall also
constitute color of title."
98. Chambers v. Chambers, 235 N.C. 749, 71 S.E.2d 57 (1952), reh'g denied, 236 N.C. 766, 72
S.E.2d 8 (1952); McConnell v. McConnell, 64 N.C. 342 (1861); Trustees of the University v.
Blount, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 455 (1816).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Chatham, 208 F. Supp. 220 (W.D.N.C. 1962), aff'dinpart, 323
F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1963) (condemnation decree); Burns v. Stewart, 162 N.C. 360, 78 S.E. 321 (1913)
(quiet title action); Lindsay v. Beaman, 128 N.C. 189, 38 S.E. 811 (1901) (record in partition
proceeding). Cf Canter v. Chilton, 175 N.C. 406, 95 S.E. 660 (1918) (partition decree not color of
title when it fails to sufficiently describe the land in question); Keener v. Goodson, 89 N.C. 273
(1883) (assignment of homestead not color of title because it did not profess to pass title but
merely attached an exemption from sale under execution to the defendant's existing estate).
100. Stewart v. Lowdermilk, 147 N.C. 583, 61 S.E. 523 (1908).
101. Note, however, that "as against the vendor, the possession of the vendee, occupying
under such a contract, does not, as a rule, become hostile or adverse until something has occurred
that places one of the parties in the position of resistance to the claim of the other .. " Knight
v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 452, 453, 84 S.E. 705, 706 (1915); Betts v. Gahagan, 212
F. 120 (4th Cir. 1914).
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which constitutes color of title serve to define the physical extent, or
acreage, of the occupant's claim,° 2 it also serves to define the nature of
the interest acquired by adverse possession maintained under it. Thus,
if for example, the occupant's deed purports to convey merely a life
estate 103 or an undivided fractional interest,'°4 the title he acquires by
adverse possession will be limited to the interest which his deed pur-
ported to convey.
Even when armed with a writing which purports to pass title, an ad-
verse possessor who wishes to avail himself of the benefits of color of
title must demonstrate that the writing meets the further requirement of
describing the property in question. 105 The rationale for this require-
ment is the previously discussed doctrine of constructive possession. 
06
It can readily be seen that without a definite description the doctrine
could not operate because there would be no clearly defined bounda-
ries out to which the claimant's actual possession could be construc-
tively expanded. 0 7
The requirement of a sufficient description is met when the instru-
ment either describes the property in question in such a manner that it
can be located and distinguished from other property or else refers to
something extrinsic, such as another deed or a plat, which furnishes the
means for so identifying it.0 8 Since the criteria of what constitutes a
sufficient description remain the same whether an instrument is as-
serted as valid title or merely as color of title,'0 9 a significant ramifica-
tion of this requirement is that a title transaction which is ineffective
due to the lack of an adequate description is ipso facto ineffective as
color of title as well.' 10
It would be wonderful if the line of demarcation between those
transactions which constitute color of title and those which do not
could be drawn simply on the basis of the three requirements just dis-
102. Berryman v. Kelly, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 269 (1852).
103. McRae v. Williams, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 430 (1860).
104. Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N.C. 406, 196 S.E. 352 (1938).
105. Peterson v. Sucro, 101 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1939); Katz v. Doughtrey, 198 N.C. 393, 151
S.E. 879 (1930); Barker v. Southern Railway Co., 125 N.C. 596, 34 S.E. 701 (1899).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 36-53.
107. Dickens v. Barnes, 79 N.C. 490 (1878).
108. McDaris v. Breit Bar "T" Corp., 265 N.C. 298, 144 S.E.2d 59 (1965); Whiteheart v.
Grubbs, 232 N.C. 236, 60 S.E.2d 101 (1950); Hayden v. Hayden, 178 N.C. 259, 100 S.E. 515
(1919).
109. Katz v. Daughtrey, 198 N.C. 393, 151 S.E. 879 (1930).
110. Carrow v. Davis, 248 N.C. 740, 105 S.E.2d 60 (1958); Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75
S.E.2d 759 (1953); Thomas v. Hipp, 223 N.C. 515, 27 S.E.2d 528 (1943). It is at least arguable that
in jurisdictions, like North Carolina, where an equally significant benefit of color of title is a
substantially shorter statute of limitations, a defective description should only deprive the claim-
ant of the logically related benefit of constructive possession. The courts, however, appear to view
color of title as an "all or nothing" proposition and therefore have never taken such a bifurcated
approach.
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cussed. Unfortunately the matter is not that simple. It is true that if
these three requirements are not met, a transaction cannot constitute
color of title, but the converse, that one which does meet all of them
will always constitute color of title, is not. Although, unlike some juris-
dictions, North Carolina does not impose limitations based on the
claimant's good faith belief in the validity of the instrument"' or ad-
here to the view that a forged 1 2 or fraudulent" 3 instrument cannot
serve as color, there are three limitations which must be examined
before a true picture of what constitutes color of title in North Carolina
emerges.
B. Limitations on Color of Title
1. "Obvious" Defects
An examination of North Carolina cases frequently finds appended
to the definition of color of title the qualifying phrase that the defect
which renders the instrument ineffective to actually transfer title must
not be "so obvious that no man of ordinary capacity could be misled by
it.""' 4 The phrase made its appearance in early cases in which the
courts were attempting to give meaning and direction to the doctrine of
color of title.' This section examines the meaning of the phrase and
the question of whether it constitutes a significant limitation on the
ability of a title transaction which meets the three basic requirements to
serve as color of title.
When the doctrine of color of title was first adopted in this state, a
good faith belief in the validity of the instrument was held to be essen-
tial" 6 and the "obvious defect" limitation may have originated as an
expression of this requirement. However, the courts very early held
that the phrase did not mean that an instrument was disqualified from
serving as color of title simply on the basis that it was subject to a
patent defect. '7 The adjective "obvious" had to be viewed in conjunc-
tion with the standard contained within the phrase itself-a person of
"ordinary capacity." Therefore, the standard that was held to be appli-
cable was "that of a layman, unskilled in the law" and the court must
111. Knight v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 452, 84 S.E. 705 (1915); Reddick v.
Leggat, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 539 (1819).
112. Fisher v. Toxaway Co., 165 N.C. 663, 81 S.E. 925 (1914).
113. Berry v. Richmond Cedar Works, 184 N.C. 187, 113 S.E. 772 (1922); Seals v. Seals, 165
N.C. 408, 81 S.E. 613 (1914); Pickett v. Pickett, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 6 (1831); Hoke v. Henderson, 14
N.C. (3 Dev.) 12 (1831).
114. Ipock v. Gaskins, 161 N.C. 673, 77 S.E. 843 (1913); Bond v. Beverly, 152 N.C. 56, 67 S.E.
55 (1910); Williams v. Scott, 122 N.C. 545, 29 S.E. 877 (1898).
115. Tate's Heirs v. Southard, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 119 (1824).
116. Burns v. Stewart, 162 N.C. 360, 78 S.E. 321 (1913); Reddick v. Leggat, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.)
539 (1819).
117. McConnell v. McConnell, 64 N.C. 342 (1870).
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exclude the presumption, generally applicable, that every man is pre-
sumed to know the law .... ,118 Applying this standard, procedural
defects such as the omission of a seal, " 9 the lack of a privy exam, 120 the
unconstitutionality of a statute, 2 and the failure to make all owners of
the property parties to a suit in which a judgment affecting the title is
rendered 22 have all been held no obstacle to the instrument's ability to
serve as color of title.
Despite the fact that the "obvious defect" limitation appears to have
originated as an expression of the subsequently abandoned good faith
requirement, even recent cases continue to append it to the definition of
color of title.'23 However, such cases do not appear to use it as an
independent basis for disqualifying a written instrument which meets
the requirements of purporting to convey title and having an adequate
description. Thus, it does not appear to represent a very significant
limitation on the ability of a title transaction which meets the three
basic requirements to serve as color of title. The same cannot be said of
the two limitations which follow.
2. Recordation Limitation
The first truly significant limitation on the ability of an instrument
which purports to convey title by definite boundaries to constitute color
of title is the result of statutes which govern the recordation or registra-
tion of instruments such as deeds, 124 wills, 12 5 mortgages 1 26 and con-
tracts to convey land.' 27 Despite early cases which held that a will
which had not been probated could not serve as color of title, 128 prior
to 1885 deeds did not have to be registered in order to do So. 12 9 How-
ever, passage that year of the Connor Act with its provision that "no
deed . . . shall be valid to pass any property interest against a pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration but from the registration thereof' 130
118. Greenleaf v. Bartlett, 146 N.C. 495, 500, 60 S.E. 419, 421 (1908); McConnell v. McCon-
nell, 64 N.C. 342 (1870).
119. Avent v. Arrington, 105 N.C. 377, 10 S.E. 991 (1890).
120. King v. McRackan, 168 N.C. 621, 84 S.E. 1027, aqf'd, 171 N.C. 752, 88 S.E. 226 (1915);
Norwood v. Totten, 166 N.C. 648, 82 S.E. 951 (1914).
121. Episcopal Church v. Newbern Academy, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 233 (1922).
122. John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Cedar Works, 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982 (1914); Amis v.
Stephens, III N.C. 172, 16 S.E. 17 (1892).
123. United States v. Chatham, 208 F. Supp. 220 (W.D.N.C. 1962), afd in part 323 F.2d 95
(4th Cir. 1963); Adams v. Severt, 40 N.C. App. 247, 252 S.E.2d 276 (1979).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (1976).
125. Id § 31-39.
126. Id § 47-20.
127. Id § 46-18.
128. Callender v. Sherman, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 711 (1845).
129. Hardin v. Barrett, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 159 (1858); Campbell v. McArthur, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks)
33 (1822).
130. Ch. 147, Laws of N.C. (1885).
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inevitably gave rise to the question of whether its application also ex-
tended to instruments asserted merely as color of title.
The issue was first addressed in Austin v. Staten,13' a case in which
the plaintiff and the defendant had each received deeds covering the
property in dispute from the same grantor. Although the defendant's
deed had been executed almost eight years before that of the plaintiff, it
had not been recorded for nine years, a year after the plaintiffs had
been recorded. It seemed clear that if the plaintiff could establish that
he was a purchaser for value he had the superior title, since he had
recorded his instrument first. Undaunted, the defendant advanced the
somewhat ingenious argument that although his deed had been regis-
tered subsequent to that of the plaintiff and therefore he could not pre-
vail on the theory that his deed was "good," it nonetheless constituted
color of title. Since it had been admitted that he had been in open and
notorious possession of the property for more than seven years prior to
the time the deed to the plaintiff had been executed and recorded, the
defendant contended that he had a superior title based on adverse pos-
session. As later cases have noted,' 32 the court could have disposed of
the case on the basis that until the deed to the plaintiff had been re-
corded the defendant's deed was valid and effective and thus he had
not been in adverse possession under an instrument that constituted
color of title for seven years by the time the action was filed. Instead,
the court chose to go straight to the heart of the matter and focus on the
fact that to adopt the defendant's argument would be to destroy the
efficacy of the recording act.' 33 On this basis, the court held that an
unregistered deed did not constitute color of title. This was, however,
merely the first step in the courts' attempt to define the extent to which
the goals and policies underlying the recording act affected the ability
of an instrument to serve as color of title.
Three years after Austin, 34 the court noted that the rule announced
in that case "may be broader than was necessary" 135 and made the first
major qualification on the requirement of recordation by holding that
except for cases in which the rival party was a purchaser for value who
had duly recorded his deed "the rights acquired by adverse possession
under color of title are not disturbed or affected by the act of 1885.
" 136
Thus, a deed did not have to be recorded in order to serve as color of
131. 126 N.C. 783, 36 S.E. 338 (1900).
132. Justice v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d 122 (1953); Janney v. Robbins, 141 N.C. 400,
53 S.E. 863 (1906).
133. 126 N.C. at 790, 36 S.E. at 340.
134. Collins v. Davis, 132 N.C. 106, 43 S.E. 579 (1903).
135. Id at 111, 43 S.E. at 581.
136. Id at 111-112, 43 S.E. at 581.
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title where the rival party was merely a donee. 137 Later cases added the
further qualification that even when the rival party was a purchaser for
value, the requirement of recordation did not apply where the adverse
claimant and the rival party derived their title instruments from in-
dependent sources.' 38 For example, if X executes a deed which pur-
ports to convey title to Blackacre to A and later 0 executes a deed
which purports to convey title to B, a purchaser for value, A's deed may
serve as color of title despite the fact that it was not recorded before the
deed to B, since the parties derived their title instruments from different
sources. If on the other hand, 0 had executed both the deed to A and
the one to B, A's deed could not serve as color of title unless and until it
was recorded.
It was also necessary for the courts to determine the requirement of
recordation with respect to another group of persons whose interests
were entitled to protection under the recording act-lien creditors.
39
Subsequently it was decided that an adverse claimant could not acquire
a title that was free of the lien asserted by a creditor of the adverse
claimant's transferor unless the instrument relied upon as color of title
had been recorded prior to the docketing of the creditor's judgment. "o
Thus, the fact that the claimant had been in possession of the property
in question for seven years under an unrecorded deed which purported
to convey title was held not to bar an execution sale premised on a lien
docketed against the claimant's transferor.'
4'
The requirement of recordation is not an absolute limitation on the
ability of an instrument to serve as color of title. Not only has the court
qualified it by restricting the requirement to cases which involve dis-
putes in which the rival party is a purchaser for value or a lien creditor
who derives his rights from the same source as those asserted by the
adverse claimant, the court has even held that the existence of an un-
registered instrument in the adverse claimant's chain of title will not
prevent his assertion of color of title based on subsequent instruments
which have been recorded. 42 Nonetheless, even this qualified require-
ment of recordation constitutes a significant limitation on the ability of
137. Kluttz v. Kluttz, 172 N.C. 622, 90 S.E. 769 (1916); King v. McRackan, 168 N.C. 621, 84
S.E. 1027 (1915).
138. Anderson v. Walker, 190 N.C. 826, 130 S.E. 840 (1925); Gore v. McPherson, 161 N.C.
638, 77 S.E. 835 (1913); Janney v. Robbins, 141 N.C. 400, 53 S.E. 863 (1906).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-18 (1976).
140. Eaton v. Doub, 190 N.C. 14, 128 S.E. 494 (1925); But ef. Johnson v. Fry, 195 N.C. 832,
143 S.E. 857 (1928) in which the adverse possessor prevailed over the grantor's judgment creditor
despite the fact that his conveyance had not been recorded on the basis that he had been in
possession for over twenty years and therefore did not base his claim on seven years of possession
under an instrument constituting color of title.
141. Pickett v. Pickett, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 6 (1831).
142. Glass v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212 N.C. 70, 192 S.E. 899 (1937). See Note, Adverse Pos-
session--Color of Title, 16 N.C. L. REV. !19 (1938).
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an instrument to constitute color of title. It appears, however, that in
light of the policies underlying the recording act and the fact that under
it notice by the prospective purchaser that someone other than his gran-
tor is in possession of the property is deemed irrelevant in establishing
priority of titles, 43 some limitation was necessary. The one ultimately
developed by the court may be viewed as merely refusing to allow a
claimant to totally circumvent the requirement of recordation and still
have the benefit of the relatively short color of title statute of limita-
tions period. On balance, the recordation limitation is both justifiable
and reasonable in scope. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said with
respect to the third and final limitation.
3. Cotenant Limitation
Since a person cannot transfer title to a greater interest in property
than that which he in fact owns,' 44 it is clear that when a tenant in
common executes an instrument which describes the common property
and purports to convey total undivided ownership of it, the instrument
is effective only as to the transferor's fractional interest. A line of
North Carolina cases starting in 1914 4 5 contain statements by the
courts that an instrument which is subject to this particular "substan-
tive" defect does not constitute color of title with respect to the interests
of the nonparticipating cotenants. This rule represents a significant
limitation on the existence of color of title and an examination of its
evolution and application reveals that there appears to be very little
justification for its existence.
Any attempt to examine the rationale and significance of the limita-
tion, that an instrument which is executed by a cotenant and purports
to convey sole ownership does not constitute color of title, must begin
with a brief look at North Carolina's overall approach to the question
of adverse possession among cotenants, since the roots of the limitation
are inextricably bound up with the general rules and concepts. Like
other jurisdictions, North Carolina recognizes that it is possible for a
cotenant to acquire sole ownership of the common property by adverse
possession but requires that notice must in some manner be given to the
cotenants who are out of possession that their rights are being repudi-
143. Bourne v. Lay Co., 264 N.C. 33, 140 S.E.2d 769 (1965); Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550,
5 S.E.2d 849 (1939).
144. Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 79 S.E.2d 479 (1954).
145. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 43 N.C. App. 419, 259 S.E.2d 348 (1979); Cox v. Wright, 218
N.C. 342, 11 S.E.2d 158 (1940); Bailey v. Howell, 209 N.C. 712, 184 S.E. 476 (1936); Bradford v.
Bank of Warsaw, 182 N.C. 225, 108 S.E. 750 (1921); John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond
Cedar Works, 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982 (1914).
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ated. 46 This requirement stems from the inherent right of every coten-
ant to occupy and possess the common property 47 which carries with it
the presumption that a cotenant's mere possession, even if open and
exclusive, is not wrongful or hostile and thus does not trigger the run-
ning of the statute of limitations on the other co-owners' action for
ejectment. 1
4 8
The term used to denote conduct which amounts to a sufficient repu-
diation of the rights of the cotenants out of possession to trigger the
running of the statute of limitations is "ouster" and it is commonly
defined as "some clear, positive and unequivocal act equivalent to an
open denial of [the cotenants' rights], and putting [them] out of sei-
sin."' 49 However, instances of "actual" ousting are rare and on the ba-
sis of "public policy, to prevent stale claims, as [well as] to protect the
tenant in possession from the loss of evidence from length of time,"' 50
the courts as early as 1833,15 1 recognized the doctrine of "presumptive"
or "constructive" ouster. Under this doctrine, the sole and uninter-
rupted possession of the common property by one cotenant, when al-
lowed to continue for a long period of time without interference from
or claim by the cotenants out of possession, gives rise to the presump-
tion that an actual ouster did occur.' 52 Twenty years was eventually
settled upon by the courts as a sufficiently long time period to warrant a
presumption of ouster.'5 3 Thus, if A, B and C are tenants in common
of Blackacre, each owning an undivided one-third interest, and A is
allowed to remain in exclusive possession of the property for twenty
years, without acknowledging the rights of B and C, and without their
making any demand or claim for rents, profits or possession, the pre-
sumption arises that at the inception 54 of the twenty-year period an
146. Williams v. Robertson, 235 N.C. 478, 70 S.E.2d 692 (1952); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141
N.C. 210, 53 S.E. 870 (1906).
147. [Ulnity of possession is the characteristic attribute of a tenancy in common. In the
absence of special facts the possession by one cotenant is deemed a possession by all coten-
ants [and] a corollary of this basic generalization [is] that one cotenant is permitted to use and
enjoy the whole property in the same manner as if he were the sole owner.
4A R. POWELL, supra note 26, § 603, at 606-607.
148. Id at 608.
149. Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 343, 137 S.E.2d 174, 186 (1964) quoting Dobbins v.
Dobbins, 141 N.C. 210, 53 SE. 870 (1906).
150. Black v. Lindsay, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 467, 468 (1853).
151. Thomas v. Garvin, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 223 (1833).
152. Collier v. Welker, 19 N.C. App. 617, 199 S.E.2d 691 (1973); Brewer v. Brewer, 238 N.C.
607, 78 S.E.2d 719 (1953); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N.C. 210, 53 S.E. 870 (1906).
153. Caldwell v. Neely, 81 N.C. 114 (1879); Covington v. Stewart, 77 N.C. 148 (1877); Black v.
Lindsay, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 467 (1853).
154. For a discussion of the doctrine of presumptive ouster, see Note, Adverse Possession Be-
tween Tenants in Common and the Rule of Presumptive Ouster, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 300
(1976) where the author notes the inconsistency inherent in a rule that provides that "even though
the presumption will not arise until the end of a twenty-year period, once it has arisen the ouster is
presumed to have occurred at the beginning of the twenty-year period."
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ouster occurred and on this basis A acquires the interests of B and C by
adverse possession. It is against this backdrop that one must examine
the limitation that an instrument executed by a cotenant which pur-
ports to convey sole title does not constitute color of title.
The earliest case to have involved a question of the effect of seven
years of exclusive possession under an instrument which was executed
by a cotenant and purported to convey sole ownership appears to be
Burton v. Murphy,' I decided in 1818. Although the court in that case
did not directly address the status and effect of a deed executed by the
owner of a one-fifth undivided interest, its decision was based on a tacit
recognition that the deed constituted color of title and that the trans-
feree's entry and possession thereunder amounted to an ouster.1
5 6
Later cases, however, adopted the position that not only did possession
maintained under such an instrument not constitute an ouster in it-
self'5 7 but that the instrument did not even have the effect of aiding the
claimant by reducing the twenty-year period required for presumptive
ouster.118 The basis given for this rule was that the effect of such an
instrument was to make the transferee a tenant in common and "in
contemplation of law his possession conforms to his true and not to his
pretended title."'' 59 Thus, the transferee is subject to the same require-
ments with respect to adverse possession as any other cotenant irrespec-
tive of the fact he may not even realize that he is one. Interestingly
enough, however, the early cases which discussed the effect, or more
accurately the lack of effect, of such instruments continued either ex-
pressly or impliedly to recognize that they constituted color of title.
60
Not until John L Roper Lumber Co. v. Cedar,16 1 decided in 1914, did a
court actually state that an instrument executed by a cotenant which
purported to convey sole title did not constitute color of title and even
in that case it was dictum which cited as support earlier cases which
had not, in fact, recognized such a limitation.
6
1
155. 4 N.C. (2 Mur.) 684 (1818), opinion at 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 339 (1818).
156. Despite the fact that there was no evidence of an actual ouster of the cotenant-grantor's
other co-owners, the court said that the possession of the grantee under the deed "from 1800 to
July, 1809, . . . forms a perfect title. . . under the statute of limitations." Id at 340.
157. Day v. Howard and Baker, 73 N.C. I (1875); Cloud v. Webb, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 317 (1832).
158. Hicks v. Bullock, 96 N.C. 164, 1 S.E. 629 (1887); Ward v. Farmer and Southerland, 92
N.C. 93 (1885); Caldwell v. Neely, 81 N.C. 114 (1879).
159. Caldwell v. Neely, 81 N.C. 114, 117 (1879), citing Day v. Howard and Baker, 73 N.C. 1.
160. Bullin v. Hancock, 138 N.C. 198, 50 S.E. 621 (1905); Breeden v. McLaurin, 98 N.C. 307, 4
S.E. 136 (1887); Hicks v. Bullock, 96 N.C. 164, 1 S.E. 629 (1887); Cloud v. Webb, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.)
317 (1832).
161. 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982 (1914).
162. The court cited five cases: Dobbins v. Dobbins, 141 N.C. 210, 53 S.E. 870 (1906); Bullin
v. Hancock, 138 N.C. 198, 50 S.E. 621 (1905); Breeden v. McLaurin, 98 N.C. 307, 4 S.E. 136
(1887); Hicks v. Bullock, 96 N.C. 164, 1 S.E. 629 (1887); and Cloud v. Webb, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 317
(1832). The Dobbins case makes no mention of color of title; in Cloud, the court, at 14 N.C. at
325, says "admitting that deed to be color of title;" in Hicks and Breeden, the court repeatedly
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Later cases picked up on the dictum contained in Roper and there
are now a substantial number of them which have reiterated this limi-
tation and relied upon it as a basis for denying a claimant's assertion of
title based on seven years possession of the common property. 163 The
explanation for the ready acceptance of this limitation may lie in the
fact that color of title ordinarily carries with it the notion that posses-
sion maintained under it is not in subordination to the rights of an-
other' 6 and perhaps it was felt that allowing such an instrument to be
labelled color of title created a conflict with the already established rule
that the possession of a cotenant is presumed not to be hostile to his co-
owners' rights.
In light of the refusal of the courts of this state to view the entry and
possession of a transferee under an instrument executed by a cotenant
as constituting actual ouster or shortening the period required for pre-
sumptive ouster, the significance of refusing to call such an instrument
color of title even when it meets the requirements of purporting to con-
vey sole title and adequately describes the common property is proba-
bly more theoretical than real. 65 It is, however, symptomatic of the
illogic and inconsistency inherent in a rule which refuses to recognize
possession maintained under such an instrument as amounting to an
ouster when the transferee who enters into possession is a "stranger,"
i.e., someone who was not already a cotenant at the time the deed was
executed.
The present rule ignores that when the transferee in possession is not
one of the original cotenants, the very fact of his possession should
serve as notice to the others that their rights may be in jeopardy and
prompt them to at least make inquiry as to the basis and extent of the
right or title the occupant is claiming.1 66 That the courts already have
refers to the deed executed by a cotenant as color of title; and in Bulin, the court, at 138 N.C. at
201, 50 S.E. at 622, says "conceding that the deed is color of title."
163. Young v. Young, 43 N.C. App. 419, 259 S.E.2d 348 (1979); Cox v. Wright, 218 N.C. 342,
11 S.E.2d 158 (1940); Bailey v. Howell, 209 N.C. 712, 184 S.E. 476 (1936); Bradford v. Bank of
Warsaw, 182 N.C. 225, 108 S.E. 750 (1921).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
165. Several early cases and one relatively recent case allude to a situation in which the status
of the deed as color of title could make a difference, i.e., where the grantee actually does oust the
other co-owners soon after receiving the deed. For example, if X enters into possession of the
common property under a deed from A which purports to convey sole ownership, and soon there-
after X actually does oust his transferor's former cotenants, B and C, by resisting their demands to
be let into possession, he should be able to acquire their interests by adverse possession in seven
years, rather than twenty, if his deed from A constitutes color of title. Since, however, it is highly
unlikely that once X actually repudiates their rights B and C will refrain from taking legal action
to enforce and protect their interests for seven years, the significance of the status of the deed is
still probably more theoretical than real. Watson v. Chilton, 14 N.C. App. 7, 187 S.E.2d 482
(1972); Tharpe v. Holcomb, 126 N.C. 365, 35 S.E. 608 (1900); Breeden v. McLaurin, 98 N.C. 307, 4
S.E. 136 (1887).
166. "The possession [of a person other than an original cotenant] is notice to the cotenants
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reservations about the present rule is evidenced by their refusal to ex-
tend it to situations where the instrument under which the transferee
entered into possession was executed pursuant to a judicial sale for par-
tition'67 or foreclosure 168 but was defective due to the failure to make
all the cotenants parties to the action. In such cases, the instrument is
deemed to constitute color of title and allows the transferee to acquire
sole title in seven years despite the fact that his possession in such a
case is no more subjectively "hostile" and provides no greater notice to
the non-participating cotenants than when it is maintained under an
instrument voluntarily executed by a cotenant.
Unlike the previously discussed "recordation limitation," a rule
which denies a deed executed by a cotenant the force and effect of color
of title even when it purports to convey sole ownership does not seem
justifiable. An approach which restricts a finding of ouster to those
cases in which the claimant in possession under such an instrument is
not one of the original cotenants, or so closely identified with one of
them that his possession could reasonably be relied upon by the others
as being consistent with and not hostile to their rights, would appear to
adequately meet any justifiable concern about protecting the interests
of the cotenants who are not in possession. The mere fact that property
is owned in common, rather than individually, is not a sufficient basis
for continuing to adhere to a rule that arose when the methods of travel
and communication available to the average person made it somewhat
reasonable for a cotenant to remain absent for years on the assumption
that his co-owner neither would nor could jeopardize his interest by
some unilateral action less than twenty years in duration. Today there
appears to be no real reason not to adopt the majority position and thus
require a cotenant to discover that the possession of his property has
fallen into the hands of a "stranger" and take the necessary steps to
protect his interest before a period of seven, rather than twenty years
has elapsed.
out of possession sufficient to put them upon inquiry and to charge them with the knowledge that
would have been received from such inquiry." West v. Evans, 29 Cal.2d 414, 175 P.2d 219, 221
(1947). See also 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 50, § 1185, at 932.
167. Amis v. Stephens, 1II N.C. 172, 16 S.E. 17 (1892); McCuloh v. Daniel, 102 N.C. 529, 9
S.E. 413 (1889).
168. Johnson v. McLamb, 247 N.C. 534, 101 S.E.2d 311 (1958). In the Johnson case, the court
noted that North Carolina "stands alone" in its adherence to the rule that a deed executed by a
cotenant which purports to convey sole ownership does not constitute color of title such that pos-
session thereunder constitutes an ouster of the other co-owners. The court went on to state that
this rule should not
be carried beyond the necessities of the particular class of cases to which it has been applied,
but confined strictly within its proper limits; otherwise we may destroy titles by a too close
attention to technical considerations growing out of this particular relation of tenants in com-
mon, and more so, we think than is required to preserve their rights.
ld at 537, 101 S.E.2d at 313, quoting John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 165
N.C. 83, 85, 80 S.E. 982, 983 (1914).
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PART THREE: SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
Despite the multitude of cases dealing with various aspects of the
doctrine of color of title, it is clear that not all the questions have as yet
been resolved with respect to the doctrine's meaning and operation.
The final section of this article briefly examines three such questions.
The first is whether a deed of gift which has been rendered void due to
its failure to be recorded within two years of its making may be as-
serted as color of title. The second is whether a quitclaim deed may be
asserted as color of title. The final question to be addressed deals not
with the existence of color of title but with its effect upon the type of
concurrent estate acquired by adverse possession when an instrument
which constitutes color of title purports to convey title to grantees who
are husband and wife.
As a general rule, registration of a deed is required only to protect
the grantee from the claims of purchasers from and lien creditors of the
grantor and is not essential to the validity of the deed as between the
grantor and the grantee.' 69 However, North Carolina by statute 7° re-
quires that a deed of gift be recorded within two years of its making or
it becomes absolutely void, even as between the grantor and the
grantee.' 7 ' A question that has arisen, but has yet to be definitely re-
solved, is whether a deed of gift that ultimately becomes void due to a
failure to be timely recorded may constitute color of title so as to enable
the grantee to acquire title by seven years of adverse possession. In a
1953 case, Justice v. Mitchell,"72 the court after "conceding, but not de-
ciding, that the unregistered deed of gift after it became void was color
of title as between the grantor and the grantee"' 7 3 was able to side-step
the question on the basis that the grantee had been in adverse posses-
sion of the property in dispute for less than seven years.
Although the Justice case did not resolve the question of whether a
void deed of gift could constitute color of title, the court did make it
quite clear in that case that, until two years had elapsed after the deed
was made, it could not be considered color of title and the grantee's
possession thereunder was not adverse because during such time the,
deed was valid and, therefore, the grantor had no cause of action in
ejectment against his grantee.' 74 With that logical and reasonable limi-
tation in mind, there does not appear to be any serious objection to the
169. Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E.2d 849 (1939); Glass v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212
N.C. 70, 192 S.E. 899 (1937).
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-26 (1976).
171. Muse v. Muse, 236 N.C. 182, 72 S.E.2d 431 (1952); Turlington v. Neighbors, 222 N.C.
694, 24 S.E.2d 648 (1943).
172. 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d 122 (1953).
173. Id at 367, 78 S.E.2d at 125.
174. Id at 366, 78 S.E.2d at 124.
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grantee's ability to assert a void deed of gift as color of title. It is true
that it is the failure of the grantee to record that results in his need to
base a claim of ownership on adverse possession, but since the deed
would still be subject to the limitation that an unrecorded deed cannot
be asserted as color of title against purchasers for value from the same
grantor who have recorded or against the grantor's lien creditors, 17 5 the
rights of such third parties would not be further jeopardized by al-
lowing a void deed of gift to constitute color of title.
A second question which has arisen with respect to the existence of
color of title is whether a quitclaim deed may constitute color of title.'76
The first time the case of Price v. fisnant'7 was before the state
supreme court, the court was concerned with the issue of constructive
possession by the plaintiff and directly referred to his quitclaim deed as
"color of title."' 78 However, as a result of an error in the trial court's
charge dealing with the burden of going forward and the issue of con-
structive possession, a new trial was ordered. After the new trial again
resulted in a verdict of title by adverse possession in the plaintiff, the
court was again faced with an appeal by the defendant. 179 This time,
the court held that the defendant's motion for a nonsuit should have
been granted on the basis that the adverse claimant had failed to estab-
lish that his possession of the property described in his quitclaim deed
was continuous and uninterrupted for a seven-year period. This find-
ing made it unnecessary to consider and determine "whether a quit-
claim deed that merely releases and quitclaims any interest the grantors
may have in the described premises (and not purporting to convey any-
thing), is or is not color of title."' 8° The court went on to note that its
statements in the prior appeal to the effect that the quitclaim deed was
color of title were not determinative and a ruling on the question was
reserved until it was necessary to the decision of a case.
North Carolina does not have a history of regarding quitclaim deeds
as inferior to warranty deeds as a means of effectuating transfers of
title. Not only have they consistently been held effective to convey
valid title,' 8' but they have also been held effective to give a title supe-
rior to that of a prior warranty deed when the grantee under the quit-
175. See supra text accompanying notes 124-143.
176. The view adhered to in many jurisdictions is that a quitclaim deed may constitute color
of title. See e.g., Whitehead v. Bennett, 92 Colo. 549, 22 P.2d 168 (1933); Miles v. Blanton, 211
Ga. 754, 88 S.E.2d 273 (1955); Thurmond v. Espalin, 50 N.M. 109, 171 P.2d 325 (1946); Morrison
v. Hawksett, 64 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1954); Graniteville Co. v. Williams, 209 S.C. 112, 39 S.E.2d 209
(1946); Porter v. Wilson, 389 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1965).
177. 232 N.C. 653, 62 S.E.2d 56 (1950).
178. "The quitclaim deed was color of title to 64.4 acres of land." Id at 648, 62 S.E.2d at 59.
179. 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952).
180. Id. at 388, 72 S.E.2d at 856.
181. Hayes v. Ricard, 245 N.C. 687, 97 S.E.2d 105 (1957).
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claim deed is a subsequent purchaser for value who records first.182
There is even authority that under some circumstances a grantee under
a quitclaim deed can invoke the doctrine of estoppel by deed. 83 Thus,
there appears to be some basis for believing that when the issue is
finally resolved, North Carolina will adopt the majority view that a
quitclaim deed constitutes color of title. However, the language of the
court in the Price case indicates that in reaching that decision, the court
may well differentiate between quitclaim deeds whose operative words
of conveyance include the terms "bargain and sell" or "convey" and
those whose operative words are limited to "release, remise and quit-
claim," allowing only the former to constitute color of title.
84
The most interesting question with respect to the doctrine of color of
title which remains to be resolved deals not with its existence but with
its effect on the type of title acquired by adverse possession. Although
the concurrent estate known as tenancy by the entirety is no longer
recognized in many states,'85 it continues to exist and, in fact, thrive in
North Carolina. Due to the presumption in this state that a conveyance
or devise of land to persons who are husband and wife creates a ten-
ancy by the entirety, 1 6 it constitutes the most common form of land
ownership among married couples. 187  Thus, the final question ad-
dressed in this section is whether the title acquired by adverse posses-
sion under an instrument which constitutes color of title and names as
grantees two persons who are husband and wife should be deemed to
be held by them as tenants in common or tenants by the entirety.
88
182. Id at 692, 97 S.E.2d at 109.
183. Dixieland Realty Co. v. Wysor, 272 N.C. 172, 158 S.E.2d 7 (1967); Harrell v. Powell, 251
N.C. 636, 112 S.E.2d 81 (1959).
184. This distinction is alluded to in Justice v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 364, 78 S.E.2d 122 (1953).
The rationale would appear to be that in the absence of words of conveyance such a deed would
fail to meet the requirement of purporting to convey title. See supra text accompanying notes 92-
101.
185. "The jurisdictions, besides North Carolina, recognizing tenancy by the entirety are: Ar-
kansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming," 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW, § 112, at 36, n.7
(1980). However, only Massachusetts and Michigan continue to recognize it in its pure common-
law form. Comment, Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirely in North Carolina.- An Idea Whose
Time Has Gone?, 58 N.C. L. REV. 997 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Real Property].
186. Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970); Jernigan v. Stokely, 34 N.C.
App. 358, 238 S.E.2d 318 (1977).
187. It has been estimated that ninety percent of the married couples owning homes in North
Carolina hold title as tenants by the entirety. See LEE, supra note 185, s 112, at 37.
188. See Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51 (1956) in which the court af-
firmed the Chancellor's decree that the estate acquired by the joint adverse possession (without
color of title) of a husband and wife was a tenancy in common, rather than a tenancy by the
entirety. The rationale for the decision was that due to the requirement of "unity of title," an
estate by the entirety "could not arise by operation of the statutes of limitation but .. only from
devise, deed or other instrument." 41 Tenn. App. at 245, 293 S.W.2d at 61.
As one writer noted, Preston was the first case "to present the problem of the concurrent estate
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On purely technical grounds, there appears to be no obstacle to
resolving the question in favor of tenancy by the entirety. In addition
to the unity of possession" 9 which is inherent in any form of concur-
rent ownership,' 90 the other four unities required for a tenancy by the
entirety' 91 would appear to be met when title is acquired by adverse
possession under color of title. The transferees will acquire title at the
same time, the expiration of the statutory period which bars the owner's
ejectment action; they will derive their title from the same source, the
instrument which constitutes color of title and forms the basis of their
claim; they will have identical interests in the property and they will
have unity of person by virtue of the marital relationship.
Although there have been serious policy questions raised with re-
spect to North Carolina's continued adherence to the tenancy by the
entirety in its common-law form,'92 the legislature has never seen fit to
abolish it. 193 A statute enacted in 1982,1'4 which equalizes the rights of
the parties with respect to possession, rents and profits, 95 makes no
attempt to modify or abolish two of the most significant incidents of the
acquired by joint adverse possession of husband and wife." 55 MICH. L. REV. 1192 (1957). Per-
haps because of this, the case has generated a great deal of comment, most of it critical. See e.g.,
Note, Real Proper. Cotenancy." Husband and Wfe: Adverse Possession, 43 CORNELL L. REV. 134
(1957); Note, Real Propery. Adverse Possession- Tenancy in Common or Tenancy by Entirety? 24
TENN. L. REV. 892 (1957); Note, Real Property, Adverse Possession by Husband and Wife Does Not
Ripen into a Tenancy by the Entirey, 10 VAN. L. REV. 460 (1957).
189. Unity of possession is the common right of every cotenant to possess and enjoy the prop-
erty. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 6.1, at 6. Despite the requirement of
"exclusive possession," two persons can acquire title by adverse possession if they claim title
jointly. Preston v. Smith, 293 S.W.2d 51, 41 Tenn. App. 222 (1956); Conneaut Lake Park v.
Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592, 66 A2d 828 (1949); Patten v. Rodgers, 417 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.
6th Dist. 1967).
190. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 26, § 6. 1, at 6.
191. In addition to unity of possession, a tenancy by the entirety requires the unities of time,
title, interest and person. Id at 23-25.
192. See, Comment, Real Property supra note 185, at 999-1006, in which the author criti-
cizes North Carolina's continued adherence to the common-law form of tenancy by the entirety
and advocates legislative or judicial action to abolish or modernize the estate.
193. Not only has the legislature never attempted to abolish tenancy by the entirety, but in
June, 1982, it enacted a statute which codifies the existing presumptions in favor of the estate by
providing that
A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, to a husband or wife vests title in them
as tenants by the entirety when the conveyance is to:
(1) a named man "and wife," or
(2) a named woman "and husband," or
(3) two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband or wife, if at
the time of conveyance they are legally married.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(b) (1982).
194. Id
195. Prior to the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6, North Carolina had followed the
common law view that the husband has the exclusive right to possession, rents and profits from
property held as tenants by the entirety. See, e.g., Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552
(1973); Hodge v. Hodge, 12 N.C. App. 574, 183 S.E.2d 800 (1971); Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253, 193
S.E. 20 (1937).
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estate-the right of survivorship 96 and the protection of the property
from the claims of the individual creditors of either spouse.' As a
result, these incidents continue to exist and make the question of the
estate acquired by adverse possession highly significant. If the action
of the legislature may be interpreted as a tacit recognition that such
incidents are still desirable as affording a certain degree of extra protec-
tion to the real property most commonly owned by a married couple,
their home, it appears that the title acquired by adverse possession
maintained under an instrument which had it not been defective would
have created a tenancy by the entirety should also qualify for such
incidents.
CONCLUSION
Color of title is not an outdated historical curiosity. In light of the
benefits which accrue to an adverse claimant when he can establish that
his possession was maintained under an instrument which constitutes
color of title, the complexities of the doctrine are well worth mastering
by attorneys involved in title transactions. Although this article has
attempted to point out the various limitations and qualifications on the
doctrine and to suggest certain changes which would give added utility
and coherence to it, adverse possession under color of title even in its
present form represents a significant method of curing defective titles
whose potential should not be overlooked. A tiny seed planted by the
legislature and nurtured by the courts as a means of promoting the
settlement and development of a new colony on the vast and rugged
shores of the New World, the doctrine of color of title has taken root
and flourished. For almost 200 years the courts of this state have la-
bored to define the doctrine and its operation and for the most part
have very good reason to be proud of their handiwork.
196. In Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924), perhaps the most outstanding North
Carolina case on tenancy by the entirety, the court explained the operation of the right of survi-
vorship as meaning that
[u]pon the death of one, either the husband or wife, the whole estate belongs to the other by
right of purchase under the original grant or devise . . . because he or she was seized of the
whole from the beginning, and the one who died had no estate which was descendible or
devisable. It does not descend upon the death of either, but the longest liver, being already
seized of the whole, is the owner of the entire estate.
Id at 204-205, 124 S.E. at 568 (citations omitted).
197. Although joint creditors of a married couple can reach property held as tenants by the
entirety by executing upon a judgment procured against both spouses on a joint obligation, the
individual creditors of either spouse may not do so. J. WEBSTER, supra note 1, § 126. See, e.g., L.
& M. Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968); Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500,
109 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924). Cf. Lewis v. Pate,
212 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937).
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